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When a voice, or music, is suddenly interrupted, one hears just at that instant 
something else, a mixture or an interstice [entre-deux] of silence and diverse noises 
that sound masked [recouvrait], but in this something else one hears again the voice 
or the music that have become in a way the voice or the music of their own 
interruption: a kind of echo, but one that does not repeat that of which it is the 
reverberation. (Nancy 1991, 62; translation modified) 
When I presented this material at the Performance Philosophy conference in Amsterdam, I began 
with a sound clip. Audience members may have recognized it as a passage from the prelude to 
Richard Wagner’s Parsifal—perhaps a keen ear even identified it as Solti’s 1973 recording. The 
passage—the leitmotif known as Grundthema or “Communion”—is a 6-bar melody that arguably 
condenses within it all the musical material of the opera. I interrupted this melody just before the 
arrival of the A♭ major chord in the second presentation of the motif to dramatize Jean-Luc Nancy’s
observation, quoted in my epigraph, that “when a voice, or music, is suddenly interrupted, one 
hears at that instant something else.” This micro-performance aimed to orient a series of 
associations that will be fleshed out here in more detail. The talk was part of a no-paper panel with 
Nidesh Lawtoo and Niki Hadikoesoemo, principal investigator and graduate fellow, respectively, of 
an ERC-funded research project, Homo Mimeticus: Theory and Criticism at the Institute of Philosophy, 
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KU Leuven.1 Our panel, Mimetic Intoxications, responded to the conference’s focus on institution, 
intervention, and intoxication by drawing genealogical connections from Plato through Nietzsche, 
Bataille, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy in an effort to diagnose the political, 
affective, and intoxicating dimensions of the various experiences these diverse authors group 
under the heading of mimesis.    
In this context, I invoked Nancy’s reflections on community and his notion of literature as an 
“interruption of myth” in order to offer counterpoints to the conference themes of institution, 
intoxication, intervention. In particular, I was interested in the idea that artists embrace, transform, 
and revalue new forms of institutions “by intervening in existing institutions from within or by 
instigating new institutions in ways that are potentially intoxicating.”2 In this paper, I examine how 
artistic practices and aesthetic concepts can be simultaneously interventions and institutions, 
drawing on the intoxicating power of artistic practice to transform institutions “from within.” Now, 
“an intervention from within that transforms the institution it intervenes in” might be a good 
paraphrase of Nancy’s claim that literature creates a new concept of community by interrupting 
the foundational institution of communities, the institution of myth. What happens when we hear 
“intervention” and “institution,” alongside Nancy’s concept of an interrupted community, as part of 
the project of Performance Philosophy? This paper aims to answer this question.  
The concept of intoxication evokes the idea of Dionysian fusion, of a type of community based on 
a certain philosophy of myth that, as Nancy shows, becomes “totalitarian” when the fictioning 
powers of myth are linked with art and politics in the attempt to create a community. 3  (An 
intoxication that aims to create a community is what I simultaneously sought to invoke and 
interrupt with the “Communion” leitmotif.) 4  In “Myth Interrupted,” the second chapter of The 
Inoperative Community, Nancy intervenes in this tradition to question the philosophical account of 
myth’s function in creating communities, to develop an alternative account of the community that 
results from literature’s continuation-as-interruption of myth. This concept of literature inflects the 
critique of myth with a theory of performativity on the basis of a general reformulation of the 
concept of mimesis that Nancy has developed alongside Lacoue-Labarthe in their collective and 
individual work over three decades (see especially Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988, 1990; Lacoue-
Labarthe 1989, 1990b; Nancy 1991, 2016). However, despite the emphasis on performativity, I 
suggest that these works have paid relatively little attention to performance in the “strong” sense, 
as theatrical and especially musical performance, which are similarly important dimensions of 
mimesis as Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe understand it. 
Indeed, the common term that links myth and art to politics is mimesis. But here mimesis should 
be taken neither as an issue of realist representation nor as secondary copying. Before mimesis 
becomes a question of “truth”—of the adequate relation between an artistic or literary image and 
its real-life object, let alone a question of simulacra and phantasms, and before it is opposed or 
even superseded by the Romantic notions of autonomy and originality—mimesis is a paradoxical 
condition. Indeed, mimesis is the human condition for the emergence of the notion of the subject—
even, or especially, as the modern subject imagines itself to be autonomous and original.5 As 
Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe have shown in examinations of a range of texts reaching from 
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Rousseau to Heidegger (passing through the Jena Romantics and Nietzsche), modern philosophy 
has engaged in an incessant struggle with the paradoxicality of a subject—a subiectum, or 
substance—that is constituted by what is not proper to it. Lacoue-Labarthe describes this 
paradoxical condition as a hyperbolic logic, a “hyperbology,” whereby the modern subject only 
becomes itself by imitating: the more it imitates (others), the more it becomes what it is (its proper 
self). Mimesis, the appropriation or incorporation of the characteristics of the other, paradoxically 
“constitutes” the self. The being that emerges through this process of self-constitution as imitation 
is thus a paradoxical being—neither self nor other, always in excess of itself. In other words, as 
Derrida puts it, the subject is an existence or “desistance” constituted through dis-appropriation.6 
This account of mimesis as desistance leads Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe to identify a complicity 
between art and politics, as they go on to show how the philosophy of myth serves as the founding 
fiction of a community that results in the catastrophe of National Socialism (Lacoue-Labarthe and 
Nancy 1990; Lacoue-Labarthe 1989). In their analysis, fascism is a totalitarian project that seeks to 
accomplish this philosophy of myth, that is, to fashion—to produce artistically, almost as a work of 
art—a people, no matter the consequences, according to the founding fiction that National 
Socialism produced for itself. The scandal, for Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe, is that the philosophies 
most critical of modern subjectivity—those of Nietzsche and Heidegger—are inattentive, and even 
complicit, with the fascist accomplishment of this catastrophic union. 
To think of the human subject as (de)constituted by mimesis, as a homo mimeticus, means tarrying 
with this condition and this history, both of which form part of any claim towards art’s capacity to 
institute communities, particularly where art is defined by its performative aspect.7 This is the 
second element of Nancy’s text that interests me: Nancy emphasizes the performativity—in the 
sense of “doing things with words”—of the formative-fictioning power of myth and art. Yet, while 
Nancy analyzes this performative function through literature—and this is my intervention to 
Nancy’s interruption—I suggest that the performative aspects of mimesis can be better 
conceptualized through acts of performative—yet embodied—mimesis: that is, through 
performance “proper.”8 
 The trajectory of my paper is as follows: first, I reconstruct Nancy’s defense of literature—or 
écriture—as an interruption of “immanentist” communities based on myth leading to a “literary 
communism” linked to what he calls a singular-plural “being in common.” I then argue that the 
concept of literature employed by Nancy still corresponds to the Romantic tradition he criticizes 
and offer a re-reading of his text that focuses on musical performance, in particular the ancient 
Greek concept of mousikē understood as the collective performance of music, poetry, and dance 
based on mimesis that Plato indicts in the Republic. While the notion of literature deployed by 
Nancy is assumed to include music, I suggest he repeats the Platonic gesture by overshadowing 
certain aspects of musical performance that can help us rethink the notions of intervention, 
institution, and intoxication. To this aim, I relate Nancy’s notion of interruption to that of iterability, 
proposing an understanding of musical performance based on the interval between one 
interruption and another, between one iteration and the other. Finally, with this concept of the 
interval in place, I return to the term “institution” to propose that the community that emerges 
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from the interruption of the interruption is an institution intervened from within, that is, an in—
stitution in desistance. Is this the kind of institution that Performance Philosophy wants to be? 
Interrupting the Myth of Myth 
Nancy’s “Myth Interrupted” is part of an infinite conversation with Bataille, Blanchot, Derrida, and 
Lacoue-Labarthe (with Heidegger as their common starting point) on the issue of literature and 
community, or “literary communism,” that extends through the second half of the twentieth 
century.9 We will have to enter—interrupt—this conversation belatedly. At stake is the attempt to 
imagine a kind of community that responds to the challenges issued by the catastrophe of National 
Socialism and the broken promise of communism after 1989. A dominant aspect in this 
conversation emerges through the philosophy of myth that extends from Herder and Goethe to 
Lévi-Strauss in which, according to Nancy, myth is defined as an “autopoietic mimesis,” that is, a 
representation or a fiction of the community that represents and produces itself out of and 
through myth (Nancy 1991, 55). In this philosophy, myth sits at the origin of humanity. To be more 
precise, myth is the origin of humanity: “myth is of and from the origin, it relates back to a mythic 
foundation, and through this relation it founds itself (a consciousness, a people, a narrative)” (45). 
To analyze this concept, Nancy distinguishes two strains in this tradition: the first situates myth as 
the birth of human consciousness, as a passage from nature to culture, muthos to logos. The second 
denounces the first as a fiction, while recognizing the formative function of the fiction of the mythic 
origin. These two traditions attain their clearest expression in Schelling, for whom fictionality itself 
is at the origin of humanity: myths are the founding fictions of a certain idea of community defined 
as communal fusion and total participation, often but not exclusively as the result of Dionysian 
intoxication. The imagined community forged from myth is one in which the individual disappears 
into the whole, in which the plenitude of social belonging preexists the atomization of modern 
individuals, and which promises a new community of equals as the utopian solution for alienated 
modernity. 
One crucial characteristic of this idea of myth is that it is only presumed to exist as such elsewhere: 
either in the past (paradigmatically in ancient Greece or “primitive peoples,” even in currently living 
non-Western societies still considered “primitive”) or in the future, as the promise of all sorts of 
utopian projects that extend (to Nancy and Lacoue-Labarthe’s consternation) from the “New 
Mythology” of the Jena Romantics to the appropriation of Teutonic and Greek mythology (via 
Wagner and Nietzsche) in National Socialism (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990). In any case, what 
matters is that “we”—Europeans (or Europeanized subjects) that imagine themselves to be modern 
or post-modern, in short, the “West”—have nothing to do with myth. Instead, Western modernity 
defines itself by the double gesture of lamenting the present absence of myth all the while 
postulating—as a source of hope, political acumen, or both—a possible future where community 
is again unified by myth (think, once again, of Parsifal).  
And if the West is defined by this will to community based on the power of myth, Nancy suspects 
that such a will to community is essentially and inescapably totalitarian or, in his language, 
immanentist. The essential definition of myth (whether it is thought as a real or a fictional origin) is 
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precisely such a will to unity, a will (volonté) to community as a desire (volonté) to realize the 
community as a communion of individuals gathered under a single will. Indeed, as Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe demonstrate, the power of myth might even define totalitarianism as such 
(Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990). In The Inoperative Community, Nancy specifies two aspects of 
the totalitarian or immanentist character of myth: on the one hand, with respect to form, the will 
to myth is “will” in a strictly Kantian sense, as the faculty of desiring determined according to reason 
such that the cause of representations coincides with the reality of these same representations. 
This involves not simply a representation of an ideal community as a fiction, but the realization of 
such a fiction as a community. Myth is a mimesis that is also a poiesis. In fact, myth is an autopoietic 
mimesis since, in Schelling’s language, myth is tautegorical (self-referential, as opposed to 
allegorical), employing fictional and performative language to produce and accomplish itself: 
“communicating itself, [myth] brings into being what it says, it founds its fiction” (Nancy 1991, 55). 
In other words, mimetic performance constitutes, under the heading of myth, an original, pure 
past of which the performance is a continuation or an actualization (in any case a copy) of the lost 
originary community that it constitutes through this same performance. According to this 
definition, European modernity depends on myth every bit as much as the communities from 
which modernity seeks to differentiate itself when it tries to break with this supposedly mythical 
origin of community: the myth of European modernity is to be a purely self-engendered 
community, hence a community defined by the “myth of myth,” that is, by the myth (the fiction) 
that there are communities that depend on foundational myths whereas European modernity 
does not, and it makes of this fiction its own foundational myth. 
On the other hand, with respect to content, myth is totalitarian insofar as “its content is always 
communion, of man with nature, of man with God, of man with himself, of men among themselves” 
(Nancy 1991, 56). This will to communion is immanentist because it defines the identity of the 
community only with respect to itself, exclusive of any transcendence, of any external alterity that 
threatens the self-identity of the community. Sometimes this takes the form of the explicit 
exclusion of a pharmakos (sacrificial victim) or an enemy defined in any number of ways, often but 
not exclusively in terms of ethnicity or race. The concept of community that persists in all versions 
of communism to communitarianism is, for Nancy, still defined by myth as the will to community, 
where community can only be represented as the total fusion of individuals “as immanent to its 
own fiction, which gathers them together and gives them their common figure” (56). This self-
accomplishment or fusion under a single body or around a leader presupposes, in turn, a certain 
concept of humanity, “of man, taken absolutely, considered as the immanent being par excellence,” 
which, Nancy argues, constitutes the stumbling block to a thinking of community (3).10 At the same 
time, and carried to its extreme, immanentism is catastrophic because, predicated on the negation 
of everything that is unlike itself, it cannot but end in its own elimination: “Immanence, communal 
fusion, contains no other logic than that of the suicide of the community that is governed by it” 
(12). 
The alternative to this immanentist account of community is not a transcendent (or 
transcendental) anchoring point—god(s), the nation-state, identity—but, Nancy specifies, an 
ecstasy that interrupts absolute immanence and which defines “the impossibility either of an 
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individuality, in the precise sense of the term, or of a pure collective totality” (6). Nancy thinks the 
being of a community that is neither transcendent nor immanent, emerging instead as the 
interruption of both these extremes, as an ecstasy in which both individual and community are 
exposed to their own finitude. Nancy calls the resulting being a singular-plural being in common. 
In this account, being emerges neither from the individualization of a previously given chaos nor 
from the fusion of pre-existent individuals. Rather, he argues, “a singular being appears as finitude 
itself,” not as an appearance (as a specter that appears but lacks reality) but through a com-
pearance (as a common apparition where “there is no singular being without another singular 
being”) (28). The simultaneous appearance of singular beings exposes each being’s finitude while 
affirming their multiplicity. As he further elaborates,   
Being in common means that singular beings are, present themselves, and appear 
only to the extent that they compear (compareissent), to the extent that they are 
exposed, presented, or offered to one another. This compearance (comparution) is 
not something added on to their being; rather, their being comes into being in it. 
(58)  
Nancy postulates a plurality of finite, singular beings that are given together, and which share their 
mutual and constitutive separation, as the two senses of the French term partager indicate. Nancy 
elaborates this conceptual genealogy along with the consequences of thinking community from 
the starting point of this being that is given “in common” in subsequent chapters of The Inoperative 
Community, including the text that interests us here, “Myth Interrupted,” which acts as a hinge 
between his critique of the humanist limitations of communism and his postulation of a “literary 
communism” that takes Bataille and Blanchot as its models (Lawtoo 2019a, 83–93). 
The compearance of singular beings, Nancy argues, is an interruption of the will to fusion of the 
community that “keeps open a space […] within immanence” (58). As we have seen, the totalitarian 
or immanentist tendency of the traditional concept of community aims for a total fusion that would 
solve the alienation of atomized individuals which is posited as antithetical to the community. In 
contrast, the plural-singular being in common described by Nancy is characterized precisely by 
interrupting this will to fusion. Here, Nancy again evokes the language of mimesis, speaking of a 
propagation or contagion that “interrupts fusion and suspends communication, and this arrest or 
rupture once again leads back to the communication of community” (60). The important point is 
that this interruption is not a rejection or a denial of myth’s founding fictionality, for it is precisely 
this rejection that defines the liberal-capitalist-Enlightened order of the West (and the affirmation 
of individualism that defines the current neoliberal regime is also predicated on the total rejection 
of the “myth of myth”). Rather, and here we reach the passage that opened this text, the 
interruption of myth makes something audible in and through this very interruption, “the voice or 
the music that have become in a way the voice or the music of their own interruption, a kind of 
echo, but one that does not repeat that of which it is the reverberation.” An echo that repeats 
nothing that precedes it, a mimesis—if one can put it like this, echoing Lacoue-Labarthe (1989)—
of nothing. The mimesis of the community that emerges after a voice or music are suddenly 
interrupted is not an image (an ideal) of a community that existed or that might exist but an 
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interruption that repeats or recalls something else, in the interstice masked by what is thus 
interrupted, namely the myth or the voice that calls for a unified community or a total communion. 
Nancy’s observation relies on an insightful phenomenological experience of listening I want to 
emphasize here, an experience that echoes Lacoue-Labarthe’s own thinking around echo and 
resonance.11 As Nancy notes, an interruption is not an absolute stop leading to pure and simple 
disappearance. In the instant a sound, or music, is interrupted, something else becomes audible. 
First, Nancy mentions an interstice or “in-between” (entre-deux), a mixture of various silences and 
noises that had been masked by a single, unifying voice. An interruption is an invocation of what is 
still audible in the interstitial instant. Because there is never pure silence, an interruption is not a 
destructive gesture but a means of articulating a relay between different voices: one voice is 
interrupted so that another becomes audible. But in this something else, Nancy goes on, one also 
hears the voice that has been interrupted as the voice of its interruption. The sound of the 
interruption is thus a kind of retention of what is not sounding anymore, an echo that is not a 
repetition but that “imprints the schema of its retreat in the murmur or the rustling to which the 
interruption gives rise” (1991, 62). The voice of myth is not heard any more in its unifying call to 
fusion but in the interruption of this call, as the voice of an exposed community of beings that 
share their finite singularity and this finite singularity only. But what is this voice? 
A name has been given to this voice of interruption: literature (or writing [écriture], 
if we adopt the acceptation of this word that coincides with literature). This name 
is no doubt unsuitable. But no name is suitable here. The place or the moment of 
interruption is without suitability […] What is unsuitable about literature is that it is 
not suited to the myth of community, nor to the community of myth. It is suited 
neither to the communion nor to communication. (63) 
This is where I perform my intervention. 
Why “literature”? Granted, no name is suitable here. But if no name is suitable, why literature? 
Literature, Nancy tells us, “is the beneficiary (or the echo) of myth, literature has itself in a sense 
been thought and no doubt should be thought as myth—as the myth of a mythless society” (63). 
Literature both continues and interrupts the work of myth as an echo that is not a repetition. 
Literature makes a work that contains both myth and its interruption as literature. Literature, then, 
names the being in common that holds nothing in reserve, that does not rely on transcendent 
entities such as god or the nation-state and which does not aim towards fusion or intoxication, all 
the while narrating, employing mimetic techniques, fictionality, even musicality, to create images 
of communities that interrupt themselves. 
The key aspect, for Nancy, is that literature works by means of a relay of interruptions by which it 
never comes to an end. Literature passes from an author to another, from a reader to another; “it 
is nothing but communication itself” (65). Unlike myth’s image of a community as a work of art that 
is closed and accomplished in itself, literature is ever shared through its interruption, it is an 
“unfinished work” that works through “unworking” (desoeuvrément), that is, by throwing into 
question the idea of community advanced in each individual work (67). Literature interrupts itself, 
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not to achieve a total synthesis of partial works but to continue an unending relay that consists of 
“an inaugural act that each work takes up and that each text retraces: in coming to the limit, in 
letting the limit appear, in interrupting the myth” (68). Thus understood, literature interrupts both 
the claim to history that comes along with myth and the authority of the writer as the fabulator or 
the teller of the myth as a singular voice that always speaks in common.  
Nancy calls this a “literary communism.” This expression invokes Blanchot just as much as it evokes 
the Republic of Letters of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as well as the closely-knit 
community that Nancy created with Sarah Kofman and Derrida and especially with Lacoue-
Labarthe and their respective partners in a commune that produced some of the most challenging 
work on literary theory in the late twentieth century (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1988; for detailed 
account of their collaboration during this period, see McKeane 2015). But it also evokes the less 
starry-eyed reality of the predominantly white, male, European elite that dominated the academic 
and political field for decades under the name of “theory” and which today survives as a market of 
struggling publishing houses, critics, and journalists in search of new luminaries and within the 
(also increasingly struggling) literature departments of Western universities.12 Thus, we might still 
ask, why insist today on “literature,” écriture, as an alternative to philosophy, especially when the 
institution of theory has ceded much of its hegemony in academia to concerns that emphasize the 
embodied, performative, and affective dimensions of artistic practices that have already 
transformed our understanding of the term “literature”? And I do not mean this as a polemic 
between departments in universities whose very existence is threatened by the neoliberal demand 
of interdisciplinarity that seeks to maximize profits by diversifying (as investors “diversify” their 
portfolios) the research interests of its increasingly precarious faculty. I pose this question from a 
position closer to Nancy’s own suspicion over closed or total communities and from my own 
suspicion that the choice of “literature” as a name for the interruption is not without its own 
genealogical complicities with myth. Thus, to pose the question in a way even closer to Nancy’s 
terms, how can literature itself be interrupted, if literature imagines itself to be interruption itself? 
Mousikē as a Performative Assemblage 
And I am not alone with this suspicion. My question—Why literature?—also orients James Corby’s 
intervention in the first issue of the Performance Philosophy journal, as he shows how, unaware of 
its own genealogy, the new movement of performance philosophy risks repeating or re-citing the 
philosophical movements it seeks to interrupt (Corby 2015). Corby traces a genealogy that links 
the contemporary notion of performance—an autotelic, “unbound practice” defined by a certain 
irresponsibility towards established ideas of truth and artistic autonomy—to the concept of 
literature developed by Nancy through its sources in Jena Romanticism. More importantly, Corby 
extends his genealogy of performance and literature back to the critique of poetry deployed in 
Plato’s Republic. In this foundational, sacrificial gesture, poetry is defined—criticized—according to 
its refusal to comply with strict regulations with respect to object, medium, and form; in other 
words, its irresponsibility (42). Yet, as Corby suggests, if performance philosophy assimilates itself 
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immediately with the literary practices rejected by Plato in the ancient quarrel, then all 
performance philosophy does is reverse the Platonic injunction without a true interruption.  
Corby reminds us that while Plato’s critique of mimesis refers to “poetry,” which translates the 
Greek poiētikē, what is at stake in the critique is rather the broader practice of mousikē, namely the 
collective performance of music, poetry, dance, and theater in specific spaces and as part of rituals, 
celebrations, and competitions that are inseparable from the self-understanding of the polis as a 
cultural unity—that is, as a community (with all the mythical implications elaborated above). But, I 
wonder, does this gesture of grouping all the diverse forms of doing under “literature,” however 
broadly construed, not ultimately define how each singular practice is understood, betraying, in a 
sense, their very singularity or the mode in which their being in common happens in each particular 
case?13 
So, when I ask “why literature” I am also asking “why not music?” If Nancy’s “literature” and Corby’s 
“performance” are the two practices that result from the Platonic gesture of purification and 
control of the unbounded performativity of mousikē, then perhaps focusing on the larger 
experience of mousikē—and not its Platonic mimetological reduction as poetry or literature—can 
help us better understand this genealogy and the role that performance philosophy plays in it. 
Mimetological decisions such as choosing a paradigm—literature, poetry, music—to understand 
mimesis carry broad consequences. The gesture of subsuming music under other art forms that 
more easily adjust to the requirements of a mimetology of representation has been repeated by 
Aristotle, Nancy, Corby, and countless others. And in this case (if only in this case), the starting 
point, the origin of the repetitions, can be confidently located. Let us return, then, to Plato’s 
Republic, the stage where the “ancient quarrel” between philosophy/literature and 
performance/mousikē first played out. 
The first mention of both mimesis and music in the Republic occurs when Socrates, Glaucon, and 
Adeimantus consider how a well-organized, “Spartan” city-state goes awry and turns into a 
luxurious or “feverish” one. The trio set blame on “all the hunters and imitators [mimetai], many 
concerned with figures and colors, many with music [mousikē]; and poets and their helpers, 
rhapsodes, actors, choral dancers, contractors, and craftsmen of all sorts of equipment” (Rep. 
373b). Excessive mimesis, they fear, destroys the community it is supposed to constitute. Their 
reasons have been examined at length, including in the piece by Corby cited above. At this point, 
Socrates emphasizes the performative effects of “imitations” on the “plastic” bodies and souls of 
the citizens, the danger that through mimesis the body might imbibe something prejudicial to it: 
“or haven’t you observed that imitations (mimeseis), if they are practiced continually from youth 
onwards, become established as habits (ēthē) and nature, in body and sounds and in thought?” 
(Rep. 395d). The fear, it is clear from the context, is not that contemplating false images will produce 
false ideas in the soul. The problem is that mousikē, as a form of performance or an enactment 
made by the poet, has effects on the constitution of the body of anyone who engages in mimetic 
practice, an affective communication that shapes and transforms the participant’s soul and body. 
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Given the powerful effects of performative practice on citizens “from youth onwards,” the 
interlocutors in the Republic set out to revise and legislate over the types of mimetic performance 
that are allowed in the city in a discussion that takes up most of books two and three. First, they 
regulate myths with respect to their content—the statements and representations about the gods 
and correct values (Rep. 376c–298b)—and further with respect to their form—the harmonic modes 
and rhythmic feet which bear a certain mimetic relation to content (Rep. 398b–403b). The point is 
that it is the models, and not their supposed imitations, that the founders of the city declare 
appropriate and inappropriate. When discussing the content of the myths, this legislation is carried 
without inconveniences. When it is a matter of harmony and rhythm, however, they become harder 
to regulate.14 Indeed, the entire discussion on music is carried out in ironic mode, Socrates and 
Glaucon excusing themselves for their lack of training in musical concepts. “I don’t know the 
modes,” Socrates says to Glaucon apologetically, “just leave [those modes] which would 
appropriately imitate the sounds and accents” of wilful, moderate, and courageous men (Rep. 
399b). With respect to metrical feet, Socrates again declares his ignorance, delegating their further 
regulation to the theorist Damon (Rep. 400a–c). 
The constitutive incapacity of discussing musical modes and rhythms in the same terms as the 
content of the myths is one of the reasons why, when the interlocutors pass their definitive 
judgment over mimesis in book ten of the Republic, the discussion is carried out with respect to 
poetry (poiētikē) rather than mousikē, which does not reappear after the purge of book three. 
Indeed, when Plato refers to the ancient quarrel between philosophy and poetry (607b), there is 
no mention of mousikē at all. After mimesis has been defined as a type of pictorial copying, or more 
precisely as the unreal reflection produced by a mirror—a simulacrum—the entire performative 
dimension of mousikē that defined mimesis in book three is relegated to an inessential position in 
relation to the “philosophical” account of ontological deceit that emerges as the historically 
dominant definition from Plato onwards.15 Yet, as we saw, it is not a concern with images and 
copies that worries the founders of this community but the educative and contagious effects of 
musical performance over the members of the polis. 
Plato does not tell us much more about mousikē in the Republic. 16  With this foundational 
philosophical gesture, he judges mimesis to be an ontologically deceptive reproduction aiming to 
conjure away all its prejudicial aspects. As long as the defenders of poetry are not able to make an 
apology for their practice, Socrates says in a famous passage, “when we listen to it, we’ll chant this 
argument we are making to ourselves as a counter-charm” (Rep. 608a). And Socrates’ apotropaic 
song is truly effective: most ancient Greek references to mousikē inevitably pass through the 
Platonic critique, so that it becomes almost impossible to recuperate anything “original” of this 
earlier practice. Plato’s strategy is part of philosophy’s myth, of its self-conception as a rational, 
disembodied account of the true nature of things, of its need to define itself against and thus 
defend itself from mousikē—that is, against all that philosophy declares unthinking, viz. the 
performative practices that work by chanting and repeating stories (muthos) without questioning 
their truth. 
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Some scholars, however, have investigated in more profundity the performance practices 
associated with Homeric poetry as well as other forms of archaic mousikē, in particular Eric 
Havelock and Gregory Nagy (Havelock 1963; Nagy 1996). For Havelock, the critique of mimesis 
stems from Plato’s reaction to the conflict between the culture of literacy in classic Greece and the 
archaic, oral practices, which relied on mousikē for the transmission of customs and laws across 
generations. All the diverse senses in which Plato uses terms related to the word “mimesis” in book 
three of the Republic refer to various experiences which have in common the oral transmission of 
poetry as paideia in Greek culture. These practices depend on rhythmic and formulaic repetitions 
that exploit rhyme, assonance, and echo to articulate ideas, clichés, and rhetorical figures with 
physical movements from the throat and mouth (singing) to hands and feet (dancing and 
instrument playing), enabling both the recollection of the formulas as well as the introduction of 
variations and changes in the ongoing composition of the poems. 
Formalizing Havelock’s arguments, we can say that mousikē is an acoustic assemblage of 
rhythmically-organized physiological, affective, linguistic, and sonorous performance aimed at the 
preservation and transmission of customs and laws, a performance or enactment that eliminates 
the difference between the poet and the poem, as well as that between the performer and the 
listener. For Havelock, the effectivity of oral-based poetry in ancient Greece depended on the 
capacity to identify with the poem, for example, by “becoming Achilles,” by identifying with his grief, 
so that “thirty years later you could automatically quote what Achilles had said or what the poet 
had said about him” (Havelock 1963). Archaic mimesis, from Havelock’s perspective, does not 
consist in copying or imitating the aspect, sound, or behavior of something else, but rather in 
sympathetic behavior, in the “power to make [the poet’s] audience identify almost pathologically 
and certainly sympathetically with the content of what he is saying” (Havelock 1963, 45). 
The mimetic identification by the audience with the poem’s hero and the poet’s narration is 
commonly understood as a form of de-subjectivation, as individual identity is given up enabling 
collective integration. This experience of Dionysian intoxication is what Nancy has in mind in his 
critique of an immanentist community defined by a will to fusion which literature must interrupt.17 
The problem, then, is that Nancy falls under Plato’s spell, determining mousikē according to Plato’s 
own condemnation of it—in opposition to both literature and philosophy, and hence according to 
Platonic ontomimetology in general—instead of the more multifarious experience that can still be 
heard in diverse contemporary performance practices. So how does mousikē differ from the myth 
that, from Herder to Nietzsche and Freud, links Dionysian intoxication to the spectacle of the polis 
that becomes a spectacle for itself? We can summarize the difference between myth and mousikē 
in five points: 
1. Mousikē is mimesis, it exploits the many imitative capacities of homo mimeticus: affectivity, 
intoxication, becoming-other; but this mimesis is not entirely—or solely—the kind of 
methexis (participation or fusion) that annuls the individual. When, as Havelock puts it, “you 
yourself” become Achilles by identifying with his grief, you do not to cease being yourself. 
Instead, you attain an intimate, affective understanding of Achille’s grief so that, thirty years 
later, you can “automatically quote” the story, or more importantly, recall the values or the 
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knowledge that the story transmits. The key term here is “quote,” which implies that 
mimesis as mousikē is a matter of iterability, of the possibility of repeating, re-playing, or 
re-presenting the narrative before others, of inscribing it in the collective memory of the 
community. Instead of fusion of self-and-other, this involves an inscription of the other in 
the self through the affective force of the dramatic performance. If, to borrow a concept 
from Bernard Stiegler, we suggest that the inscription of the other in the self is a form of 
exteriorization of memory, then the act of quoting, of reviving this inscription of the other, 
is an act of differential remembrance (Stiegler 1998). Mousikē is a mimetic performance 
that enables remembrance and hence institutes the community as the collective body that 
does the remembering.      
2. Mousikē is autotelic: to recall Corby’s term, the performance is deliberate and directed 
towards itself, encouraging “the development of the doing of that act, a sense of care 
entwined with the practice” (Corby 2015, 42). However, what is at stake here is not simply 
play or the unbounded freedom of autonomous art. Rather, the repeated performance of 
mousikē constitutes the community, which is made in, by, or through the performance in 
an act of care that is linked to remembrance. To anticipate a point I develop below, the 
performativity of the community is its own institution. 
3. Mousikē is relational: mimesis always involves more than one. Minimally, it involves one 
that imitates and one that is imitated. But when one imitates the other, neither the one nor 
the other remain the same: both become other, they become one another. This process is 
potentially infinite—echoing Bataille, we can call it mimetic excess. In some cases, it is not 
easy to tell who is imitating and who is being imitated (Taussig 1993). This situation must 
be considered not simply as an extreme case but as the condition of any mimetic 
relationship. The parts that take part (partagent) in the imitation are neither the same or 
different: they engage in difference, or their difference results from their mimetic 
engagement. From this mimetic relationship that is always at least double emerges a 
collectivity, a chorus. 
4. The specifically performative aspect of this mimetic collectivity depends on repetition and 
iterability. Mousikē is, essentially, choreography—a tracing or inscribing the movements of 
the chorus produced by mimesis. As we saw, mimesis is an open loop. In mimetic excess, 
infinite transformation threatens to dissolve the community as soon as it constitutes it. 
Choreography, the inscription of dance, of choral movement, seeks to modulate the 
endless play of mimesis by means of rhythm and harmony, that is, by coordinating time 
and space (the spatialization of harmonic space in instruments, modes, etc. as well as the 
specific movements of dance in the body and the stage) in rhythm. This simple principle of 
variation or difference in sameness is an effect of iterability, where the repetition 
necessarily alters what is repeated, as in Amiri Baraka’s “changing same” (Baraka 2010, 
180–211).  
5. As a performative inscription, mousikē operates across three levels. First, mousikē operates 
in bodies that are formed and joined through rhythmized movement, that is, spatialized 
and temporalized movement, in bodies that move in response to other bodies in mimetic 
coordination. Second, in the large-scale spacing of these movements across time: in ritual, 
understood as the repetition of an ordered series of movements, actions, gestures at 
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specific intervals in specific sites (temples, theaters, public spaces). The performance of 
ritual inscribes social time and space. Third, in the quasi-ideal or iterable structures that 
result from these repetitions: musical scales, meters, but also norms (nomos, which is also 
the name of a kind of ancient Greek musical genre), habits (ḗthē), rules of behavior, and 
values.18 As a performative inscription, mousikē creates an assemblage between these 
three levels: bodies who remember and reenact; organizations of time and space that 
enable and determine the performances; and the iterable entities that constitute the 
“material” of the performances. Community, then, is performatively inscribed onto itself as 
iterable spacing. What is inscribed is, above all, the interval, in all the musical, temporal, 
and philosophical senses of the word—I return to this concept below. 
But where is mousikē today? It clamors in batucadas, carnavales, retretas, second lines, festivals, and 
all the celebrations-performances where musicians and dancers are a spectacle to themselves; in 
funerals, wakes, and musical rituals—whether they belong to organized religions or not; it 
resonates in sound systems, picós, clubs, raves, and all spaces where recordings are transformed 
on the spot through performative iterations mediated by reproduction technology; in town 
festivals, seisúns, toques, jam sessions, bar and basement shows; in party collectives, scenes, family 
traditions; record, tape, and file sharing circles; it echoes still in some concert halls, audible in the 
ritualized clapping, the religious silence, and the faithful performance of works that come to life 
with each new iteration.   
If, as we have seen, Nancy—after Plato—declares that myth is totalitarian or immanentist in form 
and content since it aims towards the total fusion of the community in itself and as itself, we can 
suggest that the mimetic excess of mousikē interrupts the community’s will to fusion at the same 
time as it enacts it, according to a logic of the pharmakon that is never absent in the question of 
mimesis.19 But what kind of interruption is this and how does it differ from the interruption that 
literature declares itself to be? 
THE INTERVAL 
 
It is clear, then, that mousikē is not fusion but another kind of interruption: the interruption of the 
interruption. Indeed, as Nancy says, the interruption is never total, there is always an interstice 
[entre-deux] of silence and noise. A total interruption, a radical rupture, is death—which as we saw, 
is already implied in immanentism’s affirmation of closure. Thus, the interruption must itself be 
interrupted. This is a key aspect of literature, in Nancy’s account: literature interrupts itself, as an 
unending relay of institutions that commence each time. The interruption of the interruption, a 
recommencement that is not a simple continuation, is an interval; and the interval is the minimal 
ontological unit or the basic mode of the compearance of mousikē. 
Mousikē, as I suggested, is a collective assemblage of inscription. What is inscribed are the laws and 
ēthē of the community by means of the iterability of quasi-ideal entities such as harmonic modes, 
rhythmic feet, linguistic features such as rhyme and assonance, and so on. What these quasi-ideal 
elements have in common is an essential multiplicity—always at least double—whereby each 
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element depends on how it repeats another and differs from what is thus repeated. I name this 
relationship—an effect of iterability, in any case—the interval. A musical interval (an octave, a fifth, 
for example) always contains two sounds which are given simultaneously or successively. For an 
interval to be meaningful, both sounds need to be heard and understood in relation to each other. 
More precisely, the second sound determines the kind of interval with relation to the first one. A 
single sound, absolutely pure and unrelated to any other, is impossible.20 But rhythm is also 
intervallic in this respect. A rhythm always requires two articulations and it is the second 
articulation that determines the length and the meaning of the first. So it is with rhyme and 
assonance, and at larger scale with form, with the relation between dancing bodies or the 
temporality of rituals that spatializes the performances across time, and so on. In a sounding, 
performative context, iterability is always given as intervallic multiplicity.21 
The interval also exposes a constitutive aspect of iterability mentioned above, namely that the 
iteration—the second event—alters the first. Iteration is not the simple repetition of identical or 
similar units, but the constant modification of what is iterated by the iteration. Likewise, as an 
interruption of the interruption, the interval is neither mere recommencement nor pure beginning, 
but a new iteration that transforms what is previously given and remains open for future 
resignification in subsequent iterations.22 
This is why, considered in all its performative dimensions, mousikē might not amount to the 
immanentist totalization of myth that Nancy describes. Mousikē is indifferent to content and it does 
not have a tendency towards total communion or a radical break with externality any more than 
literature does. The content of mousikē is not what is iterated (the muthos in the Aristotelean sense). 
Its “content” is iteration itself and this iteration always transforms the “content” as it is re-
presented. With respect to form, especially, this aspect of iterability is precisely the interruption of 
any claim to a pure repetition of the origin. Iterability exploits the condition that no repetition is or 
can ever be the same, that nothing remains the same across repetitions. 
Hence, mousikē constitutes the community by interrupting fusion without resulting, however, in 
atomized individuals that can never come together or which, because they repeat one another, are 
all the same. Thus conceived, this is not a community of fusion or confusion (panic), but rather of 
spacing, of intervals. An interval results from interrupting continuity as a rhythm results from a 
repetition, but rhythm is not simply uniformity just as an interval is not simply a harmonic 
proportion. What is essential to both rhythm and interval is differential spacing, iterable 
interruption, not a monotonous repetition that tends towards sameness. An interval is always 
constituted by more than one, in relation but not in fusion. The community, then, is constituted by 
interruption, by constant, mimetically rhythmized interruption.  
This is not to say that communities of fusion do not emerge or are not imposed through mousikē—
in fact, this is an ambition that sits at the core of Western music, paradigmatically opera, at least 
since its origins in the late Renaissance, where music is defined as musica ficta, to employ Lacoue-
Labarthe’s (1994) term. However, I suggest, the will to fusion of mousikē is always interrupted from 
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within—which is why the most ambitious attempts at actualizing this will to fusion, Wagner’s 
Parsifal and the community in Bayreuth—are paradigmatic as failures of this program.  
The mimesis of mousikē is not, as Nancy always says, without methexis, without participation. But 
participation here resonates with all the senses of partager, that is, to divide and take part at the 
same time: partem capere, to seize the parts and to take part in, or to be a part of, the performance. 
Participation as methexis is not fusion or confusion but the simultaneous, spatialized coming 
together of a singular plural being, of parts that remain separate together. The community is 
constituted by iterability—constant, mimetically rhythmized interruption—and it can only exist, 
persist, if it preserves these intervallic interruptions. If Nancy says that through these interruptions 
we hear the “voice” of the community, this voice is also not a personal, single voice but a choir, a 
chorus, the chorus of choreography, again a chorus constituted by more than one sounding 
interval. 
But if the interval and mousikē are characterized by iterability, what distinguishes them, in the end, 
from literature, poetry, or especially from écriture? Why not keep the names “literature” or “poetry” 
as paleonyms and expand their meaning to encompass all the clamor of mousikē? After all, poetry 
is characterized—to remain close to Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s conceptual repertory—by 
caesurae and syncopes, interruptions of various sorts that are employed as much in music just as 
they are in literature.23 The short answer is, because that would be a repetition of that ancient 
quarrel where philosophy vanquished literature precisely as by determining the latter as either 
encompassing mousikē or as excluding it completely as a pharmakos. Arguing for a “proper” mousikē 
against a “proper” literature would, again, reinscribe their opposition to philosophy. The suggestion 
here is not to invert the gesture—to claim that mousikē contains all of literature and poetry—or to 
exclude literature to recover music, but to listen again to the interval between them, what 
resonates in their intersticial genealogies so as to open the possibility to think otherwise the 
affordances and dangers of the aesthetic concepts and practices that compose homo mimeticus 
today. 
THE INSTANCE OF THE INSTITUTION 
 
The final question, then, is what kind of community emerges from this performative assemblage 
that interrupts itself in rhythmized intervals. As we have seen, it is not necessarily a community of 
fusion and communion, closed in itself as an exclusive or “immunitarian” defense against alterity 
(Esposito 2011). Rather, this is a community that results from the process of repetition as 
transformation that takes place in re-presentation, in the iterability of the interval. The question 
that interests me now, however, is whether this community—defined by interrupted 
intervention—has the capacity to endure across interruptions. Is the rhythmical movement of the 
interruption simply an endless deferral? How does the deferral of closure—the constitutive 
openness that keeps the community from becoming totalitarian or immanentist—keep the 
community from interrupting itself absolutely? Or worse, from fading out and becoming irrelevant? 
How does it persist? Is this community, in other words, an institution? 
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The concept of “institution” belongs in a constellation of terms related to the words “stasis” and 
“stele,” stemming from the root *sta, meaning “to stand, set down, make or be firm,” which includes 
the terms “stage,” “stance,” “pedestal,” “stable,” “installation,” “Aufstellung,” “Herstellung,” 
“Vorstellung,” “Darstellung,” “Gestalt” and the Heideggerean concepts of “Bestand” and “Gestell.” By 
tracing this network in Heidegger, Lacoue-Labarthe shows how one of the central concepts from 
the essay on “The Origin of the Work of Art,” the stele (column), is “in the West, the sense of Being 
itself. Being…means to stand” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 66-68). Being is what is erected, what rises 
and persists. The interpretation of Being as stele (heard in “Ist” “es, estar,” “être,” i.e. “estre”) is the 
interpretation that dominates the history of metaphysics, an “onto-steleology” of Being defined as 
erection (Aufstellung). In the “Origin” essay and “The Question Concerning Technology,” Heidegger 
defines Herstellung (installation) as the proper essence of technē as poiesis. (Heidegger 2002, 1977; 
Derrida, “Introduction: Desistance” in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 22-24; Malabou 2016).  
Institution, as part of this constellation, is a mode of being. The institution is the result of an 
installation, of a poietic production or a setting in place that is established in order to endure. An 
institution, then, is not just a building that houses artworks or events but is itself a specific mode 
of being that results from poietic production, like the paradigmatic Greek temple in Heidegger’s 
essay. The institution is not characterized by its history or its power; rather, these are the result of 
a more essential characteristic, its permanence, its lasting capacity that allows it to gather and 
house a community. If this is so, what is an interrupted institution? 
By emphasizing Herstellung as the essence of art, Heidegger avoids engaging with the problem of 
Darstellung or (re)presentation, that is to say, with mimesis, which he conceives as a mode of 
secondary degradation or deviation, of unstable “dis-installation” (Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 80). In so 
doing, Heidegger obeys the Platonic determination of mimesis which, as I have shown, not only 
produces the expulsion of literature from the Republic but also the erasure of mousikē as a different 
form of community. That is to say, conceived as the result of Herstellung, the institution can only be 
defined as an immanentist institution that admits its others under specific regulations, since any 
other alternative is defined as a degradation of truth—as the result of unruly, Dionysian 
intoxication or as the agglomeration of atomized individuals, perhaps unified by the neoliberal 
principles of the free market. An institution that results from the iterative principle of the 
interruption of the interruption—an intervalic institution—is one which is always in transformation. 
In this kind of institution, the meaning of an event is always dependent on future events which 
might reaffirm, transform, or even interrupt its impact: there is always the possibility that each 
show, each performance, each meeting might be the last one. The end of one event announces—
and is hence dependent on—a future event. This means that each event has the potential to end 
the institution as a whole—in this lies both its vulnerability and the principle of its resistance 
against immanentist closure. An intervallic institution is an institution that is always already 
intervened from within, in which each iteration implies decisions about its continuity. Its power 
issues neither from above nor from below but results from its self-deferring permanence; in other 
words, its power is its capacity to be interrupted and not to be completely interrupted. 
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This intervallic, intervened institution can be represented by means of a typographical prosthesis 
that responds to the invocation of the Performance Philosophy Biennial that motivated my 
intervention, in another performative way of doing things with words: 
      Interruption 
Institution? Intervention!   In(ter)stitution?  In—stitution! 
      Interval 
The in—stitution emerges in the space or the stage of the performative, or rather in the non-space, 
in the interstice produced by the intervals of the performance. The interstice is represented in this 
grapheme by the dash that separates the in—stitution from itself, that inserts the interval as a 
spacing, undoing its stability without destroying it. The intervention of the interval, an iterated 
interruption, iterates the “inter” of “interruption,” “intervention,” and “interval,” transforming the 
institution into an in—stitution that, arising from that very intervention, does not exist but “desists.”  
 
1 http://www.homomimeticus.eu. This project has received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) 
under the European Union’s Horizon 2020 research and innovation program (grant agreement No 716181: HOM). 
2 https://performancephilosophy-amsterdam.nl/Conference. Accessed January 21, 2020 
3 And even if Wagner has been interrupted, the mistrust of the philosophical account of community that Nancy 
sketched in the 1980s has acquired today a new urgency in the rise of right-wing extremism and political regimes 
that veer towards what Nidesh Lawtoo (2019a) calls “(New) Fascism.”  
4 A paradigmatic case of a community founded by a new myth, Parsifal has attracted and troubled philosophers 
from Nietzsche to Adorno and Badiou (Adorno 1981; Badiou 2010; Waltham-Smith 2013). See also Nancy and 
Lacoue-Labarthe’s analysis in “The Nazi Myth,” especially in reference to Hans-Jürgen Syberberg’s Hitler, A Film From 
Germany (1977) (Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy 1990, 300–303). This does not mean that the idea of community in 
Parsifal, “a work of enormous ambivalence,” (Hyer and Minor 2006) can be easily dealt with—it can only be 
interrupted so that its choral multiplicity can be heard. 
5  The notion of mimesis as a human condition, which here supplements Lacoue-Labarthe and Nancy’s 
interpretation, was first developed by Gunter Gebauer and Christoph Wulf (1995) and forms the focus of the 
transdisciplinary research of the HOM Project; see above, footnote 1. 
6 The word désistance, which Derrida coins as an untranslatable concept, captures various strands in Lacoue-
Labarthe’s thinking of the subject of mimesis. For my purposes here, desistance introduces a semantic network 
that includes words like “institution,” “substance,” and “existence,” suggesting a certain impossibility of ‘consisting’ 
when mimesis—the proper improper—is taken as “constitutive” of the subject. I return to this semantic network 
in the last section of this paper, on the question of the institution. Finally, as Derrida notes, ‘to desist’ implies, in 
English, a certain kind of interruption, one that is also (de)constitutive of the subject of mimesis. (See Jacques 
Derrida, “Introduction: Desistance” in Lacoue-Labarthe 1989, 1–42.) 
7 For a diagnostic of homo mimeticus that emphasizes the role of myth in Plato and its connection to contemporary 
fascism and violent communities, see Lawtoo (2019b). 
8 To be sure, “literature” is an inclusive term that for Nancy means “writing, in a certain voice, in a singular music, 
but also in a painting, in a dance, and in the exercise of thought” (1991, 64). However, as I argue below, there is a 
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difference between thinking performance on the model of literature and thinking performance and literature on 
the model of the musical performance and performance arts. Nancy has written extensively about many art forms 
and the relations between them. See in particular Nancy (1997). 
9 For a helpful presentation of this text and its broader context, see James (2005). 
10 It is with respect to this critique of humanism that we advance the notion of a homo mimeticus, where the human 
is defined by its constitutive openness—a desistance—to an alterity that transforms the human and which creates 
a series of pathologies that seek to fend off such becomings. 
11 Nancy elaborates on the motifs of echo and resonance in his 2002 essay À l’écoute, where he links meaning as 
reference [renvoi] with aisthesis as a structure of referral [also renvoi] of the perceptible and the perceived. 
According to this model, which Nancy argues is paradigmatically present in listening, “one can say, at least, that 
meaning and sound share the space of a referral, in which at the same time they refer to each other, and that, in 
a very general way, this space can be defined as the space of a self, a subject” (Nancy 2007, 8). 
12 It remains to be established whether the contemporary rise of radical scholars from the global south, from the 
decolonial movements of Latin America and Africa through Black pessimism in the United States was enabled or 
blocked by the earlier dominance of French theory in Anglo-American academia. In that respect, it is also worth 
mentioning another image evoked by Nancy’s “literary communism,” namely Angel Rama’s notion of the “Lettered 
City,” which focuses on the role of writing in establishing practices of power across Colonial Latin America and its 
consequences for the persistence of colonial social hierarchies across the continent (Rama 1996; Ochoa Gautier 
2014). 
13 I refer again to another question posed by Nancy, “why are there several arts and not just one?” (Nancy 1997). 
14  Musical modes and rhythms correspond to modes of life—violent, willful, lax, cowardly—but this 
correspondence is entirely opaque. This depends, on the one hand, on the “indistinction” between subject and 
object that Eric Havelock characterizes as an ontology of the “oral state of mind” (Havelock 1963 see below.). 
Further, as Séline Gülgönen argues, modes and rhythms are inseparable from the things they are presumed to 
be copies of. Gülgönen joins scholars like Anne Wersinger in arguing that Greek experience tends not to 
differentiate between the sense and the sensible that is used to perceive it, such that, for example, the term akoè 
means both the audible, the organ of hearing, and that which is heard (Gülgönen 2014; Wersinger 2001). 
15 Cf. Lacoue-Labarthe’s reading of this passage, via Heidegger, in Lacoue-Labarthe (1989, 89–95). 
16 It comes up, to be sure, in other dialogues such as the Statesman and the Symposium, and especially in book II 
of the Laws, where the Athenian warns against “the peculiar difficulty about music, which is discussed much more 
than any other kind of artistic representation and needs much more careful handling than all the others” namely 
that there is a danger of music making us attracted to “evil dispositions” (kaká ēthē) since “it is extraordinarily 
difficult to know what the rhythm and harmony without speech are supposed to signify and what worthwhile 
object they imitate and represent” (Laws, 699b-e). 
17 Nancy’s distrust of mousikē is again expressed in “‘March in Spirit in Our Ranks,’” an essay added to the 2007 
English translation of À l’écoute, where he traces the affective power of National Socialism to its harnessing of the 
“expressive, communicative, pulse-shaping, disseminating power” of music, “a force of communication and 
participation that all forms of secular, religious, or aesthetic power that have succeeded each other through our 
history have not failed to recognize since at least the time when the term mousikē designated the ensemble of 
forms and exercises of expression of a wider sense than the single sense signified by words” (Nancy 2007, 52). 
18 A collection of statements about ancient Greek medicine and musical practice that began to be compiled in the 
third century BCE and circulated widely during the Renaissance (when it was attributed to Aristotle, who possibly 
wrote some of them), clearly states the relation between the inscription of norms and habit through performance, 
playing on the double meaning of the word nomos as both a “law” and musical genre: “Why are the nomoi that 
people sing called by that name? Is it because before they learned writing they sang their laws, so as not to forget 
them, as is the custom even now among the Agathyrsi? And they therefore gave to the first of their later songs the 
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same name that they gave to their first songs” (Barker 1984). 
19 Indeed, mimetic pathos can always go both ways—fusion and interruption—and is perhaps defined by the 
oscillation between them. As Lawtoo (2013) argues, there is often a movement between mimetic pathologies (such 
as fusion and violence) and patho-logies, the logos or knowledge that emerges from a familiarity with mimetic 
practices. 
20 The majority of the extant texts of ancient Greek “music theory” concern intervals, defined as mathematical 
proportions with specific characteristics: perfect, harmonic or consonant intervals (diapason or octave in a 
proportion of 2:1; diapente or fifth, 3:2; diatessaron or fourth 4:3) against inharmonic or dissonant ones that are 
not “epimoric” (where the first term exceeds the second by a single unit), along with the potentially infinite 
multiplicity of subdivisions that make up the diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic genera (Barker 2004). The 
important point is that the distinction between consonance and dissonance (and the entire system of values that 
results from the Pythagorean analysis of proportions since Plato’s Timaeus) is second to the fact that sounds are 
always given as a multiplicity, as proportion, relation, interval. 
21 It is only slightly more difficult to argue for timbre as being essentially multiple or intervallic. For a possible 
approach that considers timbre as differential, see Villegas Vélez (2018). 
22 This notion of the interval could be read along Nancy’s account of the constitution of a “listening subject” as a 
“sonorous place […] a place that becomes a subject insofar as sound resounds there,” a subject that does not 
preexist the sonorous resonance that constitutes it as a listening subject (Nancy 2007, 17). 
23 Lacoue-Labarthe describes the caesura as “an empty articulation,” a radical interruption that arrests the dialectic 
unfolding of the tragedy “such that what appears then is no longer the alternation of representations bur 
representation itself” (1989, 234). Nancy’s motif of the syncope is, likewise, an uneven disruption of rhythm which 
can be positive (as in music) or negative (as in medicine) although it does not need to be unique. Both the caesura 
and the syncope, however, are in rigor kinds of (rhythmic) intervals. 
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